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Abstract
This paper assesses the impact of demerit points on the probability
of traffic violation of drivers. To address the heterogeneity of drivers,
I use the expiration process of points to compare the behaviour of
similar drivers with different demerit points. I find that the threat
of losing a driver’s license affects only drivers close to the limit, but
reduces their probability of violation by 50 to 80 percent.
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1 Introduction
In the judicial system, the threat of punishment is used to make sure citizens
abide by the law. For drivers, this punishment takes the form of a fine. For
drivers in a country implementing a demerit point system, an accumulation
of fines leads to a greater punishment: the revocation of their license. Bour-
geon and Picard (2007) study theoretically this type of incentive structure,
and show that the demerit point system removes bad drivers from the road
and reaches a social optimum. Pulido et al. (2010) find that the introduction
of demerit points in Spain in 2006 reduced the road-related mortality by 14.5
percent 2. Dionne et al. (2011) provide some micro-empirical evidence that
drivers closer to the limit adopt a safer behaviour and have a lower probabil-
ity of violation. To do so, they compare the average residual probability of
traffic violation of drivers with 7 points with the one of drivers with 9 points,
and determine that this risk decreases by 20 percent over the interval. If
drivers with 7 and 9 points were homogeneous, then this difference in proba-
bility would reflect the impact of an increase in the number of points on the
behaviour of drivers. However, since drivers with 7 points are probably safer
drivers than those with 9 points, this difference is only a lower bound for the
actual impact of deterrence. This heterogeneity problem is omnipresent in
the literature on the impact of deterrence (e.g. Helland and Tabarrok, 2007).
The objective of this paper is to address this heteogeneity and assess the
impact of demerit points on the behaviour of drivers. To do so, I use the
expiration of traffic violations after two years as a quasi-exogenous variation
in the number of points: two similar drivers have the same number of points
at time “t”. Due to the timing of their violations, some points of one driver
will expire, while the other driver will keep the same number of points. In
that sense, two ex-ante similar drivers now have a different number of de-
merit points at time “t+1”. By comparing the probability of violation of
both groups for a given number of demerit points, I can assess the impact
of the number of demerit points on the probability of violation. Using this
method, I find that for drivers with 10 points a decrease of 3 points leads
to an increase of 50 percent in the probability of violation. For drivers with
14 points, a decrease of 3 points increases the probability of violation by 80
percent.
To determine this impact, this paper uses the administrative dataset of
2This result could be invalid, because the authors are using ARIMA on a non-stationary
time series
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the Societe d’Assurance Automobile du Quebec (SAAQ) which contains the
records of almost 3 million drivers between 1998 and 2010. Such a large
sample size is necessary for this study, because the most interesting drivers
are those who are close to the maximum number of points, and they tend to
be relatively rare. Dionne et al. (2011), for example, only have 16 drivers
(0.04% of a sample of 40 000) with 13-14 points. In comparison, this study
can rely on almost 20 000 observations in the same range to produce reliable
estimates of the effects of demerit points on driving behaviour.
2 Basic Model
Before discussing the details of the data and the empirical strategy, it is
important to present an outline of the theoretical framework. Dionne et al.
(2011) develop a model where the driver “i” maximizes her value function
using her driving effort (e). An increase in her level of effort decreases her
probability of being caught (q(e)) and her instantaneous utility. The change
in probability is self-explanatory, but the change in instantaneous utility
could be more problematic. The idea is that most violations are due to
speeding, burning red lights or not stoping at a stop sign (Tardif, 2010). All
of these violations allow the offender to arrive faster at destination which
increases the instantaneous utility of drivers. If drivers are caught, they pay
a fine, and accumulate a demerit point (p). Abstracting from the expiration
of points, the general Bellman equation can therefore be expressed as:
Wi(p) = maxe φi(e)− q(e)fine+ q(e)βWi(p+ 1) + (1− q(e))βWi(p) (1)
Dionne et al. (2011) show in a continuous time setting that effort will
increase as drivers get closer to the limit. This model provides a testable
prediction: drivers with more points should drive more carefully and have a
lower probability of violation all things being equal.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Dataset
To test this prediction, I use data from the administrative database of the So-
ciete d’Assurance Automobile du Quebec (SAAQ), a public monopoly whose
mission is to provide insurance protection against bodily harm for Quebe-
cers. To reduce the number of accidents and claims, the SAAQ introduced a
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demerit point system in 1978, according to which drivers accumulate points
for each traffic violation. The number of points given for a violation is a
function of its severity3. The system also allows a decumulation of points.
After two years, points expire. For example, if a driver is found guilty of
a 2-point offense on January 1st 2008, the two points will be removed from
the driver’s file on January 1st 2010. If a driver accumulates 15 points or
more, her driving license is revoked. To regain the right to drive, a driver
needs to wait a certain period of time before she can reapply for a license,
and attempt the theory and practice exams.
The data set used in this study contains all the traffic violations and li-
cense revocations between 1998 and 2010. For each traffic violation, there
is a unique identifier for the driver, the number of points lost, the date of
the violation and the date of the conviction. The number of violations per
year ranged from 563 964 in 2000 to 1 035 031 in 2007. For each license
revocation, I have a unique identifier and the date of the revocation. The
number of revocations ranged from 11 107 in 2000 to 29 985 in 2009. Finally,
the data also contains some limited information on the drivers: their gender
and date of birth.
4 Methodology
The traffic violations serve as a proxy for the behaviour of drivers. Simi-
larly to Dionne et al. (2011) I make the assumption that the probability
of being caught is a function of the driver’s behaviour. If drivers decrease
their probability of being caught, I infer that they must have improved their
driving behaviour. One could, however, imagine that drivers use tricks to
avoid tickets and nullify this relationship as Iyengar (2007) documents for
the three-strikes policy in California . Drivers could, for example, avoid ma-
jor highways and drive on country roads to avoid police control. Since most
violations are due to speeding (Tardif, 2010), this strategy would be coun-
terproductive, because it would probably lead to an overall longer commute
time. There is therefore no reason to expect this kind of avoidance behaviour.
Another strategy would be to let a spouse or a friend drive. If the proba-
bility of an accident is reduced by changing the driver, then this strategy is
beneficial to society. Whether drivers drive more safely, ask a safer driver to
replace them or take public transportation, the result for society is the same:
fewer accidents. In that sense, a reduction in the probability of violation is a
3Table 1 presents the number of points for the most common violations
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valid proxy for the social gains attained through the demerit point system.
To estimate the impact of demerit points on the probability of violation, I
use the expiration of points to compare the behaviour of similar drivers with
a different number of points. Of the drivers with a given number of points
at time “t”, some of them have a violation that will expire at time “t+1”,
and other do not. The number of points of the drivers in the first group
(treatment) will therefore decrease in the next period, while the number of
points of the second group will stay constant (control). If this variation were
exogenous, it would be simple to compare the behaviour of both groups and
attribute any difference in the violation probability to the change in the num-
ber of points. This variation is, however, not exogenous. Indeed, drivers are
not randomly convicted of violations. Only drivers who are in violation of
the law when driving can be arrested. The two groups could therefore differ
in their driving behaviour and driving pattern.
Dionne et al. (2011) show theoretically that drivers with the same num-
ber of points tend to have a similar driving behaviour. In that sense, if both
groups of drivers had the same distribution of points at the time of the con-
viction, they must have had a similar behaviour at that time. Figures 1 and
2 show the distribution for drivers with 3 and 6 points in 2010 respectively.
The two graphs show important difference between both types of drivers.
Figures 1 to 5 show the same distribution for drivers with 10, 11, 12, 13 and
14 points, respectively. Contrary to figures 1 and 2, the distributions for
both groups are very similar. If the distribution of points was the same, then
the average behaviour must have been the same. Given the same behaviour,
some drivers were randomly arrested and others not. In that sense, condi-
tion on a certain number of points at time “t”, the difference between the
treatment and control groups was random, which speaks for an exogenous
variation.
Figures 1 to 7
Drivers may have had the same behaviour, but there could be some sea-
sonality in the number of kilometres driven. If two drivers have the same
behaviour, but one drives more than the other, then the latter has a higher
probability of being arrested. It could therefore be that drivers who were
caught two years before the reference date simply drove more. If, for exam-
ple, a certain group of drivers always goes on a long car trip in July-August,
their probability of having a traffic violation is much higher in July-August.
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Furthermore, since the violations are redeemed after exactly two years, their
probability of having points redeemed in July-August is also higher. This
type of seasonal behaviour would lead to a spurious positive relationship be-
tween points expiring and the probability of a violation. The first event does
not cause the second; both are caused by a third event, the seasonality of
the driving behaviour. Such a phenomenon is unlikely to affect the results,
because there is no reason why this kind of behaviour should be more fre-
quent at a certain number of points. Why would drivers with 5 points have
this kind of behaviour and drivers with 10 not? In that sense, differences in
coefficients across the number of points should eliminate this problem.
If all the drivers in the sample had a valid license throughout the pe-
riod, these two issues would be the only two empirical challenges. Unfortu-
nately, every month, new licenses are issued. Since the dataset only contains
violations, it is impossible to say whether a lack of previous violations is
synonymous with a good behaviour or with the fact that a driver did not
previously hold a valid license. This ambiguity could affect the comparison
between drivers whose points expire and those whose points do not, because
the treatment group clearly had a valid license two years ago. The control
group, however, might not have had a violation at that time, because they did
not have a valid license at the time. If this were the case, the treatment and
control groups would be significantly different; the former would have more
driving experience than the latter. In such a case, one would expect less
experienced drivers (control) to be more prone to dangerous driving than
experienced drivers (treatment). Consequently, I would find that treated
drivers are less likely to commit a violation, even though they have fewer
points. Since I expect the opposite relationship, this empirical issue would
only reduce the magnitude of the coefficient and produce more conservative
estimates. If this problem is substantial, it will be so for drivers with a small
number of points. It is indeed unlikely that many new drivers manage to
accumulate enough points in a short period of time to be part of the sample
of drivers with more than 10 points who are the focus of the analysis. To
prevent this potential problem, I exclude all drivers that lost their license
between 2006 and 2010 from the analysis. Furthermore, I remove all drivers
aged between 16 and 24 in 2010 from the sample. By removing both groups,
I am reducing the chance that treated drivers were different from the control
in that the latter were driving in 2008 while the former were not.
The lack of data on the status of drivers does not only reduce the infor-
mation on past driving, it also affects the information on present driving.
No violation could mean that the driver did not commit any violation or it
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could mean that a driver emigrated or stopped driving. If a driver leaves the
province, she will not accumulate any further points on her Quebec driver’s
license, but she might still have demerit points at a given point in time. If
drivers whose points expire have a higher probability of leaving the province,
what appears to be a reduction in the probability of violation could simply
be an increase in the emigration probability. The only way through which
drivers can escape the scrutiny of the SAAQ is by leaving the province. If
they do so, they will probably move to another province. In 2008, about 25
000 people left Quebec for another province (Statistics Canada, 2011). This
number is small, and there is no reason to believe that the number of demerit
points was correlated with the emigration decision, meaning that very few of
these people would have many demerit points. In that sense, the impact of
emigration on the results is probably minuscule.
The previous discussion has highlighted some potential empirical issues
that could jeopardize the comparison between both groups, but none of these
challenges actually poses a threat to the validity of the results. To under-
take this comparison, I need to calculate the number of points of a driver at
a reference date, whether some points are redeemed over a certain period,
and whether the driver committed a traffic violation within a certain period.
With this information, I can study two situations in which the expiry of
points could affect the behaviour of drivers. In the first one, the expiry of
points in “t” could affect the driving behaviour in “t+1”, in the second one an
expected expiry of points in “t+1” could modify the driving behaviour in “t”.
Figure 8 shows the timeline of events in the first scenario. To calculate
the number of demerit points of a given driver at a reference date “t”, I sum
the points accumulated through convictions between “t-24” and “t”. If a
person was convicted of a violation in period “t-24”, those points will expire
in “t”, so I can distinguish between “treated” and “control” drivers. For a
given number of points in “t”, I then compare the probability of a viola-
tion committed in the period “t+1” between both groups. As an example,
I calculate the number of points as of April 1st 2010. I then determine the
drivers whose points will expire during the month of April, ie the drivers who
were convicted of a violation in April 2008. I then compare the probability
of violation in May and June 2010 for the two types of drivers.
Figure 8
Figure 9 shows the timeline of events for the second scenario. I calculate
the number of points the same way as I did in the first scenario. I then
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determine which drivers will redeem points in period “t+2” and create both
groups. Finally, I compare the behaviour of both groups in “t+1” for a given
number of points in , I also study the impact of the expectation of expiry
of points on the behavior of drivers. Figure 2 shows the timeline. Now in-
stead of taking the period after the redemption to compare the behaviour
of drivers, I consider the period before the redemption. If drivers expect
to redeem points, they could change their behaviour before the redemption
actually takes place.
Figure 9
Instead of simply comparing the probabilities, I control for certain drivers’
characteristics in the following probit regression:
Violation = β0 + β1Treatment + β2Age Dummies + β3Male + ut (2)
The variables involved in the regression are hereby defined:
• Violation is a dummy variable which indicates whether a violation was
committed in the two months following (first scenario) or preceding
(second scenario) the month of the expiration of points. Since this
variable is binary, there is no indication of the severity of the violation
through the number of points.
• Treatment is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for those
drivers who had 3 points expire during the month “t” and takes the
value 0 if the driver did not have any point expire in the same month.
I chose an expiration of 3 points for two reasons. First, it is has a
certain salience for the driver and is therefore more likely to affect the
behaviour. Second, a 3-point violation is the most frequent violation
(Tardif, 2010) thus providing a large enough sample of drivers with
points expiration to reject the null hypothesis.
• Age Dummies are created for the following age groups: 25-34, 35-44,
45-54, 55-64 and more than 65. Since younger drivers tend to have a
higher probability of violations, it is important to control for age.
• Male equals 1 for male and 0 for female. Since males tend to commit
more violations, it is important to control for gender.
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This probit regression is performed separately for each number of demerit
points. One would expect the coefficient for treatment to be larger for drivers
with many points than for drivers with few points, because the difference in
points probably matters more for drivers closer to the limit than for those
further away. This relationship between the value of the coefficient and the
number of points of the drivers in the sample will shed some light on the rela-
tionship between driving effort and the number of points stated by Dionne et
al. (2011). If effort is constant across the number of points, then my results
will validate the assumptions from Bourgeon and Picard (2007) according
to whom drivers do not change their behaviour as a function of their total
number of demerit points.
To increase the power of the rejection tests, I pool reference dates. I cal-
culate the number of points, identify the redeemed and non-redeemed groups,
and observe the violation at four reference dates: January 1st, April 1st, July
1st and October 1st 2010. I then pool the observations together, and perform
regression (1) for each number of demerit points.
5 Results
Before considering the results of the probit regressions, let us first study the
relationship between the number of points and the probability of violation.
Without any deterrence, this function should be increasing: the worst drivers
accumulate the most points, and they have a higher propensity to commit
violations than the ones with few points. With deterrence, drivers tend to
be more careful as they approach the limit which reduces their propensity to
commit violations. If the deterrence effect is stronger than the self-selection,
there could be a decrease in the probability of violation in the neighbourhood
of the limit as suggested by Abbring et al. (2003) as moral hazard. Figure 10
shows this relationship. It would seem that there is a positive relationship up
to 8 points. Afterwards, the probability of violation remains fairly constant
at 9 percent. This graphic would speak for some deterrence starting at 9
points, but it is difficult to determine its magnitude.
Figure 10
The probit regressions offer a more robust analysis of the impact of deter-
rence on driving behaviour. As mentioned previously, the number of points
could have an impact on the driving behaviour at two moments: before and
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after the variation. Expecting the expiry of points, drivers could become less
careful, because they know that their total number of points will soon de-
crease. Similarly, drivers could become less careful after the expiration when
their total number of point has actually decreased.
5.1 Change of Behavior after the Treatment
Table 2 shows the value of the coefficients on the redemption variable. Two
results stand out:
First, the coefficient for treatment is positive and significant in the 9 to
14 points range. This coefficient equals 1 when the number of points of
drivers decreases, meaning that a reduction in points leads to an increase in
the probability of traffic violation for drivers with a total number of points
between 9 and 14. Conversely, this result indicates that drivers change their
behaviour and drive more carefully when their total number of points exceeds
9 points. To better understand better the magnitude of the results of table
2, let us compare the actual probability of violation for treated and non-
treated drivers at different numbers of demerit points. At 10 demerit points,
the probability of violation of drivers who were lost 3 points is 12.2 percent
(2 377 obs), while the same probability for those who did not lose points is
8.1 percent (40 778 obs). This difference of 4.1 percent is an increase of 50
percent in the probability of violation. At 14 demerit points, this probability
of the redeemed drivers is 10.7 percent (719 obs) while it is 5.9 percent (7 682
obs). In this case, the loss of three points leads to an increase of more than
80 percent in the probability of traffic violation. In both cases, the difference
in 3 points is far above the 20 percent reported in Dionne et al. (2011).
Second, there seems to be a significant negative coefficient for drivers
with 3 to 6 points. It is hard to understand why drivers whose total number
of points decreases would drive more carefully. This counter-intuitive effect
could be due to the data problem discussed in the methodology. Drivers
whose points did not expire (control) might not have been driving at the
time of the expiration. In that sense, treated drivers could be more expe-
rienced, and therefore less prone to violations. Since this effect is small in
comparison to the positive coefficients between 9 and 14 points, we can safely
assume that it is due to imprecise data.
Table 2
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These results support the model from Dionne et al. (2011). Overall,
there seems to be an improvement in the behaviour of drivers. However,
this improvement can only be noticed between 9 and 14 points. For drivers
with fewer points than 9, there doesn’t seem to be an improvement in the
driving behaviour as their number of points increase. It could be that the
improvement is so small that it is impossible to capture it through regression
analysis or it could be that the function linking the number of points to the
effort is flat below 9 points. One reason why behaviors could start changing
at around 9 points is that the SAAQ sends a letter informing the driver of
her number of points when the driver has reached 7 points. A person with 6
points accumulating 3 points would get the letter, and possibly change her
behaviour. With fewer than 7 points, drivers might not be aware of their
total number of points nor of the consequences of accumulating 15 points.
It is, however, important to know that the SAAQ does not send any letter
informing the driver of a reduction in the number of points due to an ex-
piration of points. The evidence from table 2 suggests that drivers are not
only aware of the expiry of points but also change their behaviour accordingly.
5.2 Change of Behaviour Before the Treatment
Table 3 shows a picture similar to the one of table 2. Again, drivers start
changing their behaviour at around 9 points. The magnitude of the coeffi-
cients is similar to the ones of the previous table. It may come as a surprise
that the coefficients at 13 or 14 points in table 3 are similar to the ones in
table 2. In the previous case, the drivers could afford to gain some points,
because they had actually lost the points. In this case, however, the points
have not be removed yet, so drivers need to stay below the 15 point limit.
The problem is that the limit is not perfectly enforced. It is therefore pos-
sible for drivers with 14 points to commit a 2-point violation and not lose
their license. The next section will discuss the stringency of the limit.
Table 3
5.3 How Rigid is the Limit?
So far we have assumed that the limit is perfectly enforced: a person with 13
points who drives 33km/h above the speed limit and is caught will accumu-
late two points and thus lose her license. The actual revocation in Quebec
is not as stringent, because new points are not added to the total number of
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points at the time of the violation, but at the time of the conviction. In other
words, it is possible for drivers to delay conviction, wait for some points to
expire, plead guilty, and avoid revocation. If drivers use this strategy, the
deterrence of the point system loses its power, and could explain why the
coefficients of table 2 do not increase when going from 10 points to 14 points
and why the coefficient at 14 points is significant in table 3.
To study to which extent drivers act strategically to delay their violation,
I conduct a regression explaining the delay between violation and convic-
tion. In the first specification, I only include the total number of points
and a dummy variable whether the violation would bring the driver to the
limit and lead to a revocation. Since the relationship between the number
of points and the delay could be non-linear, I consider a model where I only
use dummy variables for the number of points. Finally, I add the revocation
dummy to the non-linear model. This variable equals 1 when a violation
would bring a driver above the maximum. Table 4 provides evidence for
the fact that drivers do use the delay strategically. Drivers threatened by
a revocation, for example, take on average three to four months longer to
be convicted. Since drivers are probably aware of this possibility, they are
probably not deterred as much as they would be if the violation date were
used instead of the conviction date. At this point it is impossible to know
to which extent the possibility to delay violations affects the deterrence and
thus the behaviour of drivers.
Table 4
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6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of a variation in the num-
ber of demerit points on the behaviour of drivers. This task is challenging,
because drivers with different number of points are probably also different in
other ways. In that sense, when comparing their behaviour, it is impossible
to say what causes differences in behaviour: self-selection or deterrence. To
address this heterogeneity problem, this paper uses the expiration of points
after two years as a quasi-experiment: two similar groups of drivers who had
the same number of points now have different number of points in the next
period. When comparing the probability of violations of both groups, the
analysis suggests that a reduction from 10 to 7 points leads to an increase
of 50 percent in the probability of violation, and a reduction from 14 to 11
points increases the probability of violation by 80 percent. These effects are
much larger than the 20 percent reported in Dionne et al. (2011) without
accounting for heterogeneity. This paper also studies to which extent drivers
tend to delay the conviction to avoid revocation.
Further research should investigate how differences in the implementa-
tion of demerit point system may change the deterrence of such schemes.
Delaying the conviction , for example, may reduce the incentives of drivers
to change their behaviour. Comparing coefficients across jurisdictions with
different policies could suggest avenues to improve the demerit point system.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (3 Points in
2010)
3 points.pdf
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10 15
Number of points two years before expiration
Treated Control
Drivers with 3 points in 2010
Distribution of Points in 2008
14
Figure 2: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (6 Points in
2010)
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Figure 3: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (10 Points in
2010)
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Figure 4: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (11 Points in
2010)
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Figure 5: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (12 Points in
2010)
12 points.pdf
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10 15
Number of points two years before expiration
Treated Control
Drivers with 12 points in 2010
Distribution of Points in 2008
18
Figure 6: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (13 Points in
2010)
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Figure 7: Distribution of Points Two years a before the Expiry (14 Points in
2010)
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Figure 8: Impact of Treatment on Future Driving Behavior
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Figure 10: Probability of Violations by the Number of Demerit Points
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Table 1: Points for Each Violation
Speeding by 11 to 20 km/h 1
Speeding by 21 to 30 km/h 2
Speeding by 31 to 45 km/h 3 or more
Speeding by more than 45 km/h 4 or more
Burning a red light 3
Not stopping at a stop sign 3
Not wearing a seat belt 3
Note: The number of points in the two last categories depend on the speed
limit where the driver speeded. For example, a driver speeding by 42 km/h
in a 50 km/h zone will have 6 points added to her file.
Table 2: Impact of Redeeming Three Points on the Probability of a Violation
in the Following Two Months
Demerit Points Coefficient on Redemption t-value Sample
3 -0.063∗∗∗ -6.77 1 397 470
4 -0.042 -1.09 243 099
5 -0.040∗∗ -2.42 345 890
6 -0.030∗∗ -2.03 255 385
7 0.002 0.08 92 341
8 -0.009 -0.43 97 177
9 0.109∗∗∗ 4.56 78 468
10 0.238∗∗∗ 6.92 43 155
11 0.081∗∗ 2.40 29 446
12 0.149∗∗∗ 3.44 19 899
13 0.24∗∗∗ 4.27 10 825
14 0.314∗∗∗ 4.71 8 401
Note: These numbers are the coefficients on the dummy variable
redemption in a probit regression explaining the occurrence of traffic
violation (=1) when controlling for age and gender of the driver. * (10
percent), ** (5 percent) and * (1 percent).
23
Table 3: Impact of Redeeming Three Points on the Probability of a Violation
in the Previous Two Months
Demerit Points Coefficient on Redemption t-value Sample
3 -0.037∗∗∗ -3.59 1 045 302
4 -0.009 -0.20 180 117
5 -0.003 -0.16 257 270
6 -0.008 -0.48 190 025
7 0.012 0.37 68 412
8 -0.028 -1.16 73 385
9 0.115∗∗∗ 4.25 58 339
10 0.198∗∗∗ 4.93 31 891
11 0.109∗∗∗ 2.88 21 820
12 0.246∗∗∗ 5.08 14 604
13 0.142∗∗ 2.00 7 879
14 0.331∗∗∗ 4.30 6 221
Note: These numbers are the coefficients on the dummy variable
redemption in a probit regression explaining the occurrence of traffic
violation (=1) when controlling for age and gender of the driver. * (10
percent), ** (5 percent) and * (1 percent).
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Table 4: Evidence of Strategic Behaviour on the Number of Days between
Violation and Conviction
(1) (2) (3)
Total Number Points 7.929∗∗∗
(140.95)
Potential Revocation 108.1∗∗∗ 128.0∗∗∗
(61.86) (46.15)
2 points 11.00∗∗∗ 11.00∗∗∗
(23.64) (23.67)
3 points 20.57∗∗∗ 20.57∗∗∗
(48.91) (48.98)
4 points 28.56∗∗∗ 28.56∗∗∗
(31.07) (31.11)
5 points 30.49∗∗∗ 30.49∗∗∗
(45.15) (45.21)
6 points 41.83∗∗∗ 41.83∗∗∗
(54.29) (54.37)
7 points 57.27∗∗∗ 55.31∗∗∗
(49.44) (47.78)
8 points 62.65∗∗∗ 60.89∗∗∗
(58.08) (56.50)
9 points 82.70∗∗∗ 79.81∗∗∗
(64.42) (62.19)
10 points 111.8∗∗∗ 106.2∗∗∗
(65.04) (61.68)
11 points 122.2∗∗∗ 115.0∗∗∗
(68.57) (64.39)
12 points 150.9∗∗∗ 82.45∗∗∗
(66.47) (30.43)
13 points 181.6∗∗∗ 68.92∗∗∗
(62.75) (18.21)
14 points 195.6∗∗∗ 67.58∗∗∗
(59.25) (15.69)
Constant 57.95∗∗∗ 59.35∗∗∗ 59.35∗∗∗
(349.79) (334.52) (334.98)
N 760648 760648 760648
r2 0.042 0.041 0.043
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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